Ideas for Rationalization of Florida's Fisheries

By Don Leal and Vishwanie Maharaj

Discussions during the meeting focused primarily on the spiny lobster fishery, and the need to decrease habitat damage by reducing the number of traps in this fishery. Other candidate fisheries for rationalization were also identified.

Spiny Lobster

The spiny lobster fishery off Florida is lucrative for commercial fishers, averaging $25 to $35 million in total exvessel revenue annually. Recreational divers also value the resource as a source of personal enjoyment. The annual lobster catch by recreational divers comprises approximately 25 to 30 percent of the total annual catch. Both commercial and recreational uses entail economic and environmental issues.

In the commercial fishery, there are several means for taking lobsters. About 90 percent of the commercial catch is taken with traps; another 8 percent is taken by commercial divers; and, another 2 percent is taken with bully nets. In the trap sector, tradable trap certificates have been in place since the early 1990s as a means of controlling the number of traps used in the annual harvest. The issue here is that prior to and throughout the trap certificate program there have been an excess number of traps available in the fishery. In addition, the nature of the catch each season is such that most of it occurs near the start of the season (a classic case of a race for fish) and that lobster trap fishermen tend to leave their traps in the water for extended periods near the end of the fishing season, when storm conditions tend to move them around on the sea floor. There is concern that this can result in damage to sensitive habitat such as coral reefs.

The current approach in the trap sector has been to reduce the number of traps available in the fishery through passive means and active means. Passive reduction entails a 25 percent reduction in the number of traps each time trap certificates are transferred from one party to another through market transactions. Active reduction entails the state of Florida issuing across-the-board trap reductions by as much as ten percent overall from one year to the next. Most of the active reductions occurred in the 1990s. They have since been put on hold because of opposition by fishermen. Passive and active measures have resulted in the total number of traps in the fishery declining from an estimated 850,000 at the start of the tradable trap certificate program (early 1990s) to approximately 500,000 plus today. However, the current number of traps available in the fishery still represents a sizable excess. Estimates of the desired level - the level that maximizes profits and the level that is just enough to achieve maximum sustainable harvest - represents 180,000 and 250,000 traps, respectively.

There are now concerns that the motivation to reduce traps through passive means has reached a point of inertia because commercial buyers can't find commercial sellers. As noted above, there is strong resistance from commercial trap fishermen to have their traps reduced by government intervention (active reduction). The excess number of traps not only results in lower than maximum profits, it exacerbates environmental problems. Unless managerial changes are made in the trap fishery, both problems will remain.

On the diver side of the commercial fishery, the growing concern is that a contingent of divers have resorted to using artificial "casitas" made by depositing various types of debris on the ocean floor. Casitas serve as an attractant to lobsters, thereby increasing the size of the catch for divers per outing. The catch share of this commercial sector increased substantially in the early 2000s, so much so that it has prompted the use of daily catch limits as a means of controlling harvests. Trip catch limits are not only inefficient they may not be an effective means in controlling the catch. Divers may simply resort to making more trips during the day and dealers may hide a large delivery by reporting one trip's catch on several trip tickets.

One environmental issue here is that casitas may cause damage to the marine ecosystem by interfering with the growth of natural flora and fauna (Correct?). The practice of using casitas to attract lobsters can result in "localized depletion" and conflicts with the trap fishery? The state of Florida has declared their use illegal until such time that research can prove otherwise. One managerial problem associated with the regulation is that it is difficult to enforce across a wide area off the Florida coast.

On the recreational side, the bag limit (6 lobsters/person/day and 24/vessel/day) has been changed to 6 lobsters/person/day as a means of achieving tighter control of this sector's overall catch. Although there appears to be no evidence of uncontrolled growth in the recreational catch, the bag limit is seen by many as too inflexible to meet the different harvest preferences of recreational fishermen across a broad region.

Based on recent discussions with representatives of the Florida Fish and Game Commission, three ideas were offered and discussed as a means of addressing the problems in the lobster fishery.

1. The first idea is to allow commercial trap certificate holders to sell some of their trap certificates to recreational fishing interests desiring larger bag limits than the current one size-fits-all 6 lobsters/person/day. There are indications that recreational fishers would be willing to pay for additional bag limits, or an annual allowance and that this would provide a means of reducing the excess number of traps in the commercial trap fishery. Reduction of traps through willing-buyer- willing-seller means is preferred to the alternative of exercising additional across the board reductions by the state of Florida. This proposal has been discussed with various representatives in the lobster trap fishery and the recreational dive fishery, with some positive feedback. However, there is an influential group of commercial trap fishermen (in the Keys?) who have expressed concerns about "selling out" to the recreational sector and are resistant to this approach.

Yet to be worked is how much recreational fishermen are willing to pay trap fishermen for their trap certificates and corresponding bag limit in a real market setting, and whether this amount will result in enough market transfers to achieve a significant reduction in traps. In addition, a workable formula for translating trap certificates to additional bag limits has to be worked out so that both sides are satisfied that they see what they are trading for clearly.

2. The second idea is to create an individual fishing quota (IFQ) fishery in the commercial dive lobster fishery. It is felt that this sector has not been in place long enough and is considerably smaller so that it poses fewer obstacles to significant management change than the other two fisheries. Given signs that the commercial dive fishery may be harder to control through traditional regulatory methods and the high costs of enforcement against illegal casitas, this fishery appears to be positioned best for substantive change. Notably, both commercial trap fishermen and recreational divers may be very supportive of more definitive management of the commercial dive catch through IFQs because these two groups are concerned over the growing share of the catch from the commercial dive sector. In addition, IFQs would not only rationalize the commercial dive fishery but it would provide a means of demonstrating the benefits of IFQ rationalization to both the trap and recreational dive fisheries.

An IFQ program for the commercial dive sector could also allow for trading with the commercial trap sector. This alternative would allow a commercial diver who wanted to increase his/her annual allocation to purchase the catch history from a commercial trap fisherman whose traps would then be retired from the fishery.

The biggest issue here is in developing a constituency within the commercial dive sector supportive of such a change. The benefits of IFQs will have to be shown to this sector, possibly through evidence provided by commercial divers in other fisheries that use IFQs.

3. The third idea may be considered an intermediate step toward full blown IFQs in the trap fishery. Proposed here is an immediate translation of trap certificates to some estimated catch quota whenever trap certificate(s) change hands between fishermen through market transfers. One of the enticements for such an approach is the removal of the 25 percent passive reduction mechanism, ,thereby eliminating the transaction costs currently associated with trap certificate transfers. Instead, the market would be used as a means of transferring the "old catch' amount to more efficient trap fisherman, or to new entrants in the fishery. The benefits here would be that traps would be removed from the available trap inventory in the fishery through passive means.

One of the issues here would be the motivation for a current trap fisherman to buy trap certificates to hold catch quota. In this case, why would the fisherman want to hold quota instead of traps? The answer would be that an additional regulatory exemption would have to be in place. For example, suppose the tail end of the general season was closed and all traps would have to be removed from the water except those who purchased catch history. The exemption would be that only fishermen with quotas could continue to fish up to a point that their catch satisfies their quota amount. This would be a motivation for a current trap fisherman to obtain quota through purchase of traps. Another motivation would be if trip limits were assigned to trap fishermen. One could exceed ones trap limits by the amount of quota held.

Another variation on this idea, not discussed at the meeting, is a voluntary rights based program (IFQ or harvesting cooperative) for the trap sector. Fishermen who chose to participate would only be allowed an annual harvest that equates to their catch history. Catch histories would be calculated using an agreed upon formula prior to the start of this program. The motivation for fishermen to move participate in such a program could be exemption from restrictive regulations such as seasonal closures and trip limits.

Stone Crab Fishery

There was a brief discussion on the potential for an IFQ program in the stone crab fishery. Stone crab fishermen are concerned about the level of overcapacity in their fishery and market gluts during the open season, and have requested that managers consider a stone crab trap reduction program. Members of the working group were of the opinion that stone crab fishermen may be more amenable to an IFQ program or some other form of rationalization. Many stone crab fishermen also participate in the lobster fishery, and a successful stone crab IFQ program could influence the acceptance of a rights based program in the lobster trap fishery.

Blue Crab Fishery

Blue crab fishermen may also be interested in a rights-based program as evidenced by their acceptance of the recently implemented trap reduction program.

Recreational scallop fishery

There is a recreational scallop fishery prosecuted at a limited number of locations in the Panhandle area of Florida? Current bag limits are very restrictive (10 gallons per boat). There is evidence of excess demand in this fishery and a tag program is a viable option for managers and fishermen to consider.

It is important to keep in mind that this document is definitely a "work in progress." These ideas need to be explored more fully by running them through various scenarios and analyses. They could use additional "venting" by offering them as points of discussions in informal meetings with various representatives of the fishing industry.

By all means, feel free to offer your own points of clarification for the time being.