Angling Management Organizations:
Integrating the Recreational Sector into Fishery Management

By Jon G. Sutinen and Robert J. Johnston

As with the commercial industry, recreational fishing is a large and growing enterprise. Between 1996 and 2000, the number of recreational outings within the United States grew by more than 20 percent, with a third of the growth occurring in the Gulf of Mexico region. By 2001, 34 million fishing enthusiasts-16 percent of the total population-were fishing an average 16 days in both fresh and marine waters. In other parts of the world, angling is even more common. In New Zealand, recreational fishing comprises 35 percent of the country's total catch; in Australia, as much as a quarter of the population participates in the sport.

Recreational fishing's rising popularity is having a significant impact on fisheries in many coastal regions of the world, including diminishing the size of some fish stocks, overcrowding popular fishing areas, contributing to a race-to-fish dynamic, and exacerbating the conflict between the commercial and recreational fishing sectors. These impacts are threatening the future of recreational fishing in the United States and in other parts of the world. Government regulations attempting to limit the fishing season and control the allowable catch to increase fish stocks have failed.

The benefits of a property rights approach over government control in preventing overfishing is well known and understood in fisheries throughout the world. Where government management of fisheries has been known to be "burdensome, inflexible, and ultimately ineffective, individual fishing quotas (IFQs) have a proven track record in helping to sustain and increase fish stocks, ease the race-to-fish, reduce overcapacity, and even benefit the marine environment.

In an effort to protect the future of recreational fishing, this article examines a similar "rights-based" approach to commercial fishing, called angling management organizations. AMOs seek to control recreational overfishing through a community-based approach by allocating quota or fishing rights-a fixed share of the region's total allowable catch (TAC)-among groups of recreational anglers. The organizations, in turn, sell shares or ownership rights to individual member anglers. Anglers' right to fish would be defined by their quota or share. They would reserve the right to sell and trade their shares but the total quota would not exceed the TAC.

As with IFQs, AMOs would encourage individual fishers to become stewards, providing incentives for them to protect their limited resources. According to the authors, AMOs "are expected to strengthen resource stewardship, reduce enforcement and monitoring costs, alleviate management conflicts, and produce greater long-term net economic benefits in recreational fisheries."

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